We develop a model of figurative or indirect speech, which may convey a meaning that differs from its literal meaning. The model yields analytical conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium and delivers a number of comparative statics results.
Introduction
This paper develops a signaling model of figurative or indirect speech, which may convey a meaning that differs from its literal meaning. In the model, a speaker has a thought or meaning that she may want to communicate to a listener. The speaker can send the listener a direct and unambiguous message that clearly reveals her thought to the listener.
Alternatively, she can send an indirect and ambiguous message that has a literal meaning that differs from her actual thought. In other words, she can express her thought figuratively.
Expressing a thought figuratively may actually be less costly than expressing it unambiguously for several reasons. First, expressing a thought figuratively may simply be easier and less time-consuming than disambiguating it, especially if the thought is complicated.
Second, by expressing a thought figuratively, the speaker can potentially communicate it without articulating it, which may enable the speaker and listener to avoid liability for offending third-party listeners with whom they may have a conflict of interest. Third, it may enable the speaker to avoid incurring liability for offending the listener if the speaker and listener have a disagreement over actions. As Pinker (2008) and Pinker, Nowak, and Lee (2008) have argued, indirect speech carries the advantage of "plausible deniability." However, expressing a thought figuratively carries a greater risk of miscommunication, because the listener might naïvely interpret the expression literally even though it is meant figuratively (an aspect not taken into account in the analysis by Pinker, 2008, or Pinker, Nowak, and Lee, 2008) . The model assumes that there is a potential tradeoff between figurative and direct speech, and that the speaker and listener choose how to speak and interpret most advantageously, given this potential tradeoff. We analyze the model in the case where the speaker and listener agree over actions and in the case where they potentially disagree over actions. From the model, we derive analytical conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium. We then employ these conditions to obtain comparative statics results and to systematically analyze particular forms of figurative speech, including terseness, irony, and veiled bribery. For instance, in the case where the speaker and listener agree on actions, we find that, ceteris paribus, speech is figurative for a larger range of the model's parameters if the speaker cares only a little about being understood while the listener cares a lot about correctly understanding. Then, the speaker does not pay the cost of disambiguating her message, and the receiver nonetheless deciphers it, giving rise to terseness (using few words to convey much meaning). The model also explains why irony (using words to express the opposite of their literal meaning) is rarely positive and, instead, is usually negative or sarcastic. If the speaker's thought is negative (positive), speaking ironically involves using an expression that has a literal meaning that is positive (negative). Given the possibility of naïve interpretation, using an expression with a positive literal meaning is generally less costly than using one with a negative literal meaning. On the other hand, speaking directly is generally more costly if the speaker's thought is negative than if it is positive. Thus, irony is more likely to be negative.
We also find that, in the case where the speaker and listener potentially disagree on actions, speech is figurative for a greater range of parameters if the probability that they disagree on actions is higher, because this increases the speaker's expected cost of being direct. In an application to bribing of police officers who can issue speeding tickets at their discretion, we find that bribes are more likely to be veiled than direct if more officers are honest and reasonable, if the premium for car insurance rises less sharply with speeding offenses, or if the penalty for attempted bribery is higher.
The model also implies that increasing the penalty for attempted bribery reduces the probability of successful bribery taking place, even if it has no effect on the probability 3 of attempted bribery occurring. The reason is that increasing the penalty for attempted bribery induces the briber to bribe more indirectly, which reduces the probability that the bribe will succeed. This provides a novel justification for laws that strictly punish not only completed bribery but also attempted bribery. 2 Section 2 below discusses related literature and our contributions to it. Section 3 develops a basic model in which interlocutors agree on actions and uses it to analyze two forms of figurative speech, terseness and irony. Section 4 develops an extended model in which interlocutors may disagree on actions and uses it to analyze another form of figurative speech, veiled bribery. Section 5 summarizes and suggests avenues for future work.
Literature Review and Contribution

Economics Literature
Our paper is related to the economics literature on communication. In the standard economic model of communication, a sender with private information sends a message to an uninformed receiver, who then chooses an action that affects the payoffs of both the sender and receiver.
One approach, initiated by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) , assumes that the sender's information is verifiable and that the sender can withhold information but not lie. This is referred to as "verifiable disclosure games." The second approach, initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982) , assumes that the sender's information is unverifiable and that the sender can lie arbitrarily without direct costs. This is referred to as "cheap talk" games. We assume that information is not always verifiable and that talk is not cheap. We emphasize that direct communication can be more costly than indirect communication, but that direct communication is more likely to be understood. Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) introduce direct lying costs in the Crawford and Sobel framework and show that senders almost always claim that their type is higher than it is and receivers nevertheless infer the true types of the senders from their claims, i.e., language is "inflated" in equilibrium. In their modeling of deceptive speech, Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) introduce credulous receivers who believe whatever they hear as being true and examine how the presence of such receivers affects the behavior of fully rational agents. We employ a similar strategy in our modeling of figurative speech: we introduce naïve receivers who always interpret ambiguous messages in a certain way. This device allows us to pin down the literal meaning of ambiguous messages. Crawford (2003) is the first to introduce behavioral or boundedly rational types in a formal model of communication. The author studies incentives to lie about intentions regarding future actions in a class of asymmetric hide-and-seek games. Ellingsen and Östling (2010) develop a general level- bounded rationality approach, and Demichelis and Weibull (2008) develop an evolutionary stability approach, to analyze lying about intentions in large classes of games that include coordination games.
A few papers formalize aspects of literal meaning in cheap-talk games. Farrell (1993) assumes that the literal meaning of messages not used in equilibrium is clear, i.e., these messages are understood even if they are not believed, but does not address the literal meaning of messages used in equilibrium. We address whether messages have literal or figurative interpretation in equilibrium. Blume (1996) models the literal meaning of messages via trembles and finds that, at least in common interest games, only equilibria in which equilibrium meaning coincides with literal meaning are robust. Lipman (2009) argues convincingly that the prevalence of vagueness in language is difficult to explain using a framework in which messages are costless and in which the speaker and listener are rational and their preferences are perfectly aligned. We provide an explanation for figurativeness in language using a framework in which messages are costly and may be interpreted naïvely rather than rationally and in which the speaker and listener may disagree over actions. Blume and Board (2010) analyze intentional vagueness in a rich framework in which messages are costless and the speaker and listener are fully rational or strategic but disagree over actions. In their model, the speaker is one of two types depending on the realization of a private signal, and each type of the speaker has the same continuum of costless messages available. The speaker has a bias that measures the degree to which she disagrees with the listener over actions, and the listener is assumed to observe the speaker's bias. Our model is different in a number of respects: messages are costly; not all messages are available to all types of the speaker; the listener may be of a sophisticated or naïve type, where the naïve type interprets messages non-strategically; the listener may also be one of two other types, agreeing or disagreeing with the speaker over actions; and the speaker's types are not observable to the listener. Moreover, because our model is simpler in some dimensions, we are able to find equilibria for general parameter values using analytical methods, rather than compute equilibria numerically. Despite these modeling differences, one of our key results has a clear parallel in Blume and Board (2010) . The authors find that intentional vagueness is monotonic in the sender's bias. Similarly, we find that a greater probability of disagreement over actions increases the parameter range for figurative speech. We also employ our analytical conditions to obtain several other comparative statics (e.g., a greater benefit to the listener of correctly understanding the speaker also increases the parameter range for figurative speech) and to address a variety of instances of pragmatic inference, such as terseness, irony, and bribery, which Blume and Board (2010) do not address.
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Whereas Blume and Board (2010) and Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) assume that no messages are type-specific, our model assumes that some messages are type-specific and some messages are not. Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) naturally assume that all messages are available in all states because they model deception, and Blume and Board (2010) naturally assume that all messages are available in all states since they assume that messages are costless. However, we model direct versus indirect speech, not costless speech or deceptive speech. Indirect speech need not be employed to deceive, and direct speech may be costlier than indirect speech. In modeling direct versus indirect speech, it is reasonable to assume that some messages are costlier than others and that some messages are only available in some states. Consider the classic Gricean example of terseness that we will employ to illustrate our basic model later on: Matt wants beer for his party, and Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street." If she knows that there is a store on 3rd Street but does not know whether it sells beer, she can say, "There's a store on 3rd street," or say, "There's a store on 3rd street, but I don't know if it sells beer." Obviously, the latter statement is more fastidious and costlier to utter than the former. Now, if Liz knows that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer, she can say, "There's a store on 3rd street," or say, "There's a store on third street, and I know it sells beer." But if she knows that there is a store on 3rd
Street that sells beer, she would never say, "There's a store on 3rd street, but I don't know if it sells beer," unless she has incentive to lie outright. In our basic model, we assume no incentives to lie and provide conditions for speech to nonetheless be figurative in equilibrium. Blume and Board (2011) focus on the efficiency losses arising from private information about language competence. They model the listener's lack of language competence as an inability to distinguish possible messages. We model the listener's lack of sophistication as an inability to interpret messages non-literally. Hertel and Smith (2011) develop a model in 7 which the sender incurs a greater cost to send a message that is more elaborate. We make related assumptions in our model. However, Blume and Board (2011) and Hertel and Smith (2011) are not concerned with figurative or indirect speech.
Linguistics Literature
Our paper is also related to the literature on applications of game theory to pragmatics.
For a selective survey, see Jaeger (2008) . Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) derive pragmatic rules of persuasion that maximize the functionality of discourse. Sally (2003 Sally ( , 2005 ) models communication as a coordination game, drawing implications for a wide range of linguistic phenomena. Our model is different in that it features private information. Parikh (2001 Parikh ( , 2007 develops what he calls a "game of partial information" to account for successful communication in coordination settings. In such a game, the listener's act of understanding is explicit, whereas it is part of the Bayesian updating and solution process in signaling games of the Lewis (1969) and Spence (1973 ) tradition. Van Rooij (2004 analyzes conversational implicatures profitably within a classic signaling framework. Our model differs from those of Van Rooij and Parikh in that we not only consider the uncertainty about the speaker's meaning but also about the listener's type. Pinker (2008) and Pinker, Nowak, and Lee (2008) analyze indirect speech in a model where the speaker is uncertain about the listener's type and where the listener may be of a type who would not cooperate with the speaker. They show that indirect speech is a dominant strategy because it carries the advantage of plausible deniability if the listener is an uncooperative type. Our model differs from theirs in that we consider the uncertainty about the speaker's meaning as well as about the listener's type. With uncertainty of the speaker's type, indirect speech carries a risk of miscommunication and therefore is not a dominant strategy, contrary to what Pinker (2008) and Pinker, Nowak, and Lee (2008) have argued. Thus, our model unifies two strands of the game-theoretical linguistics literature by considering a fuller type space for the speaker and listener. Franke (2009) defines a new equilibrium refinement, termed "iterative best response" (IRB), which is argued to be more intuitive and effective than existing refinements in signaling games applied to linguistics. IRB assumes that players differ in terms of their reasoning level, , and that a level-( + 1) player always best responds to an unbiased belief that her opponent is a level- player. The equilibrium refinement is further set up to uniquely pick out the equilibrium that involves implicature in the numerical examples of signaling games that are analyzed. Franke (2009) does not provide conditions on the signaling game under which the iterative best response procedure always reaches a fixed point. Also, this paper does not derive formal comparative statics for implicature, as we do here.
Summary of Contribution
We summarize the contributions of our paper relative to previous work as follows. First, our model allows for different types of the listener as well as the speaker, and it allows the costs and benefits of speaking and understanding to depend on the speaker's and listener's types and to be arbitrary to a large extent. It features type-specific messages as well as messages available to all types and allows costs of different messages to be different, which we argue are reasonable choices for modeling direct versus indirect speech. Second, our model provides analytical conditions for speech to be figurative and yields sharp comparative statics results, e.g., a greater benefit to the listener of correctly understanding the speaker increases the parameter range for figurative speech. Third, it allows us to address a variety of observed patterns of pragmatic inference, including terseness, irony, and bribery. Our model provides a novel explanation for why irony is usually sarcastic and a novel argument for the effectiveness of laws that strictly punish attempted bribery. 9
Basic Model
A speaker, , has private information,  ∈ { 1   2 }, which he would like to convey to a listener, . The listener must choose one of two actions, ( 1 ), which is the action that is appropriate if the speaker's state is  1 , or ( 2 ), which is the action that is appropriate if the speaker's state is  2 . There are two direct messages, " 1 " and " 2 ", each of which is only available to the speaker in the corresponding state. Thus, sending either of them would completely reveal the state to the listener. However, it is costly for the speaker to send and for the listener to receive " 1 " and " 2 ", with costs   1  0 and   2  0 for the speaker and with costs   1  0 and   2  0 for the listener, respectively; the motivation being that these messages may be long or compromising. There is also an indirect message, call it " 2 ", that is available to the speaker in both states, with costs to the speaker of   1 in state  1 and   2 in state  2 and with cost to the listener of   1  0; this may represent a statement that is shorter or less compromising. We assume that " 2 " has the literal meaning of  2 , and hence there is an asymmetry in that   1    2 = 0.
Upon hearing the message " 2 ", the listener must interpret it. We assume that the listener is one of two types,  ∈ { 1   2 }: a sophisticated type,  1 , who chooses whether to interpret " 2 " literally as indicating  2 or figuratively as indicating  1 , i.e., chooses between actions ( 1 ) and ( 2 ); and a naïve type,  2 , who always interprets " 2 " literally as indicating  2 and so always chooses the action ( 2 ). Upon hearing the message " 1 ", the listener always chooses the action ( 1 ), and upon hearing the message " 2 ", the listener always chooses the action ( 2 ). Note that incorporating a naïve type who always interprets " 2 " as indicting  2 is a way of specifying that the literal meaning of " 2 " is  2 .
In the basic model, the speaker and listener agree over actions in that both want the action () to be taken in the state . If the state is  1 and the listener takes the action ( 1 ), then the speaker receives a benefit   1  0 and the listener receives a benefit   1  0.
If the state is  2 and the listener takes the action ( 2 ), then the speaker receives a benefit   2  0 and the listener receives a benefit   2  0.We denote by  ∈ (0 1) the prior probability that the speaker's information is  1 and by  ∈ (0 1) the prior probability that the receiver is sophisticated. The extensive form of the game is given in Figure 1 . The speaker has two information sets, which are labelled 1 and 2, and the type- 1 listener has one nonsingleton information set, which is labelled 1.
We assume that   1 −   1  0 (otherwise, the speaker would never use message " 2 " in state  1 ). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) of the game in Figure 1 and derive conditions for the existence and uniqueness of PBEs in which speech is figurative.
We define a PBE to be figurative if it involves the speaker sending the ambiguous message " 2 " in state  1 and the listener responding by taking action ( 1 ) (i.e., interpreting " 2 " as meaning  1 ). There are two possible types of figurative PBEs. In what we call a type-P figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 2 " in state  1 and message " 2 " in state  2 , and the type- 1 listener responds by taking action ( 1 ). In a type-S figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 2 " in state  1 and message " 2 " in state  2 , and the type- 1 listener responds by taking action ( 1 ). In a type-P or type-S figurative PBE, the probability that speech is figurative is  (since there can be no figurative speech with a naïve listener).
We define the other possible types of PBEs to be non-figurative. In what we call a type-P non-figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 2 " in state  1 and message " 2 " in state  2 , and the type- 1 listener responds by taking action ( 2 ). In a type-S1 non-figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 1 " in state  1 and message " 2 " in state  2 , and the type- 1 listener responds to " 2 " by taking action ( 2 ). In a type-S2 non-figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 1 " in state  1 and message " 2 " in state  2 , and the type- listener responds to " 2 " by randomizing between actions ( 1 ) and ( 2 ).
There can also be mixed-strategy PBEs in which both the speaker and listener randomize.
However, there is at least one pure-strategy PBE in every range of the model's parameter space (as shown in Proposition 1 below), and any mixed-strategy PBE in which both the speaker and listener randomize is unstable in the sense that any small perturbation of the listener's beliefs about what the speaker meant upsets it and leads to a pure-strategy PBE.
In contrast, the types of PBEs named above are stable in the sense that they are robust to at least some small perturbations. For this reason, we focus only on these types of PBEs.
The types of PBEs named above are also stable in the sense that they satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) . Any type-P figurative, type-S figurative, type-P nonfigurative, and type-S1 non-figurative PBE obviously satisfies the Intuitive Criterion since in any such PBE, all non-singleton information sets are on the equilibrium path. In a type-S2 non-figurative PBE, the information set following the message " 2 " is off the equilibrium path. However, since   1 −   1  0, sending message " 2 " can never be dominated for the type- 1 speaker relative to this equilibrium, whether the state is  1 or  2 . Thus, even a type-S2 non-figurative PBE satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
Equilibrium Analysis
The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the stable PBEs of the game in Figure 1 . Proofs of propositions are in the Appendix.
, there is a type-S figurative and a type-P non-figurative PBE.
, there is only a type-P non-figurative PBE.
, there is only a type-S1 non-figurative PBE.
, there is a type-P figurative and a type-S1 non-figurative PBE.
, there is a type-S figurative and a type-S1 non-figurative PBE.
, there is a type-S1 non-figurative and a type-S2 non-figurative PBE.
, there is a type-S figurative, a type-S1 non-figurative, and a type-S2 non-figurative PBE.
The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 1:
and there is a type-P figurative PBE iff
(2)
Moreover, there is a unique figurative PBE (of one type or the other) iff
From condition sets (1)-(3) in Corollary 1, we obtain the following comparative statics:
Corollary 2 There is a figurative PBE for a larger range of parameters, and there is a unique figurative PBE for a larger range of parameters, if  is higher,
Ceteris paribus, speech is more likely to be figurative when the sender cares only a little about the state in question (  1 is low) while the receiver cares a lot about it (  1 is high).
Then, the sender does not pay the cost of disambiguating the message, and the receiver nonetheless deciphers it, giving rise to conversational implicature. 14
Applications
Condition sets (1)-(3) in Corollary 1 can help to explain what causes figurative speech or conversational implicature to be likely to work, and what makes it likely to fail. We now employ these conditions to provide an original, systematic analysis of two classic examples of conversational implicature that have been adapted from Grice (1989) .
Terseness
Example 1. Matt wants beer for his party. Responding to Matt, his sister Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street."
Correspondence with model. Either there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer, state  1 , or there is a store on 3rd Street, which may or may not sell beer, state  2 . If Liz knows that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer, she can say, "There's a store on 3rd Street, and I know that it sells beer," message " 1 ", or she can say, "There's a store on 3rd Street,"
message " 2 ". If Liz knows simply that there is a store on 3rd Street, which may or may not sell beer, she can say, "There's a store on 3rd Street," message " 2 ", or she can say, "There's a store on 3rd Street, but I don't know if it sells beer," message " 2 ". If Matt is sophisticated, and Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street," Matt can interpret this as meaning that there is a store on 3rd street that sells beer and therefore go to the store on 3rd street, action ( 1 ), or he can interpret it as meaning simply that there is a store on 3rd street, which may not sell beer, and thus go somewhere else, action ( 2 ). If Matt is naïve, and Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street," Matt always interprets this as meaning simply that there is a store on 3rd street, which may not sell beer, and thus go somewhere else, action ( 2 ). If Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street, and I know it sells beer," Matt always understands that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer and thus goes to it, action ( 1 ). If Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street, but I don't know if it sells beer,"
he always understands that there is simply a store on 3rd Street, which may not sell beer, and thus goes somewhere else, action ( 2 ).
Analysis. Many stores sell beer, so the prior  that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer is high. Liz's cost   1 of saying, "There's a store on 3rd Street, and I know it sells beer," is high because such prolixity is tiresome. In contrast, Liz's cost   1 of saying, "There's a store on 3rd Street," is low since this statement is concise. Matt's benefit   1 of understanding that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer when there is such a store is high because he wants beer to make his party successful. In contrast, Liz's benefit   1 of communicating that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer when there is such a store is low because, although she still cares a little about her brother's party being successful, it is not her party. On the other hand, Liz's cost   2 of saying, "There's a store on 3rd Street, but I don't know if it sells beer," is high because this sentence is lengthy and tiresome. In contrast, Liz's benefit   2 of communicating, and Matt's benefit   2 of understanding, that there is simply a store on 3rd Street, which may not sell beer, when there is such a store is low because this information is not as relevant in this context. Lastly, Liz knows that her brother is not too sophisticated, though not too naïve either, so the prior  is intermediate.
Thus, condition sets (2) and (3) in Corollary 1 hold, and there is only a type-P figurative PBE in which Liz says, "There's a store on 3rd Street," when she wants to communicate that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer, and she says, "There's a store on 3rd
Street," when she wants to communicate that there is simply a store on 3rd street, which may not sell beer, and Matt interprets, "There's a store on 3rd Street," as meaning that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer if he is sophisticated.
Now, suppose instead that Liz cares a lot about the party being successful because she is co-organizing it. Then, her benefit   1 of communicating that there is a store on 3rd Street that sells beer is very high. In this case, neither of the condition sets (1) or (2) 
Irony
Example 2. Ted has a reputation for not being a fine friend. Speaking to Liz at the party, Tom says, "Ted is a fine friend."
Correspondence with model. Ted is not a fine friend, state  1 , or he is a fine friend, state  2 . If Tom knows that Ted is not a fine friend, he can say, "Ted is plainly not a fine friend,"
message " 1 ", or he can say, ironically, "Ted is a fine friend," message " 2 ". If Tom knows that Ted is a fine friend, he can say, "Ted is a fine friend," message " 2 ", or he can say, "Ted is simply a fine friend," message " 2 ". If Liz is sophisticated, and Tom says, "Ted is a fine friend," Liz can interpret this as meaning that Ted is not a fine friend and therefore avoid him, action ( 1 ), or she can interpret it as meaning that Ted is a fine friend and thus not avoid him, action ( 2 ). If Liz is naïve, and Tom says, "Ted is a fine friend," Liz always interprets this as meaning that Ted is a fine friend and thus does not avoid him, action ( 2 ).
If Tom says, "Ted is plainly not a fine friend," Liz always understands that Ted is not a fine friend and thus avoids him, action ( 1 ). If Tom says, "Ted is simply a fine friend," Liz always understands that he is a fine friend and thus does not avoid him, action ( 2 ).
Analysis. Tom's cost   1 of saying, directly, "Ted is plainly not a fine friend," when in fact Ted is not a fine friend is very high because others at the party may hear this and tell Ted that Tom has been talking trash about him behind his back. Moreover, Tom's benefit   1 of communicating that Ted is not a fine friend, or equivalently his cost of miscommunicating that Ted is a fine friend, when Ted is not a fine friend is not too high. Indeed, Tom's cost of being misunderstood as meaning that Ted is a fine friend is moderate since at least this imparts a positive feeling and allows Tom to avoid the impression that he is talking badly behind Ted's back. In contrast, Liz's benefit   1 of understanding that Ted is not a fine friend is high because this would give Liz a warning not to associate with Ted. On the other hand, Tom's cost   2 of disambiguating that Ted is a fine friend by saying, "Ted is simply a fine friend," is low because saying something nice about a friend is easy and pleasing.
Moreover, Tom's benefit   2 of communicating that Ted is a fine friend, or equivalently his cost of miscommunicating that Ted is not a fine friend, when Ted is a fine friend is very high. Indeed, Tom's cost of being misunderstood as saying that Ted is not a fine friend when
Ted is a fine friend is significant since this could result in his close friend's reputation being harmed. Lastly, the prior  is high because Ted has a reputation for not being a fine friend, and the prior  is high because Liz is known to be generally sharp-witted. Thus, condition sets (1) and (3) in Corollary 1 hold, and there is only a type-S figurative PBE in which Tom says, "Ted is a fine friend," when Ted is not a fine friend, and he says, "Ted is simply a fine friend," when Ted is a fine friend, and if Liz is sophisticated, she correctly interprets, "Ted is a fine friend," ironically as meaning that Ted is not a fine friend. ¥ Example 3. Ted has a reputation for being a fine friend. Speaking to Liz at the party, Tom says, "Ted is not a fine friend."
Correspondence with model. Ted is a fine friend, state  1 , or he is not a fine friend, state  2 . If Tom knows that Ted is a fine friend, he can say, "Ted is simply a fine friend," message " 1 ", or he can say, ironically, "Ted is not a fine friend," message " 2 ". If Tom knows that Ted is not a fine friend, he can say, "Ted is not a fine friend," message " 2 ", or he can say, "Ted is plainly not a fine friend," message " 2 ". If Liz is sophisticated, and Tom says, "Ted is not a fine friend," Liz can interpret this as meaning that Ted is a fine friend and thus not avoid him, action ( 1 ), or she can interpret it as meaning that Ted is not a fine friend and thus avoid him, action ( 2 ). If Liz is naïve, and Tom says, "Ted is not a fine friend," Liz always interprets this as meaning that Ted is not a fine friend and thus avoids him, action ( 2 ). If Tom says, "Ted is simply a fine friend," Liz always understands that Ted is a fine friend and does not avoid him, action ( 1 ). If Tom says, "Ted is plainly not a fine friend,"
Liz always understands that Ted is not a fine friend and avoids him, action ( 2 ).
Analysis. Tom's cost   1 of saying, directly, "Ted is simply a fine friend," when Ted is a fine friend is low since saying something nice about a friend is easy. But Tom's benefit   1 of communicating that Ted is a fine friend, or equivalently his cost of miscommunicating that Ted is not a fine friend, when Ted is a fine friend is very high. Indeed, Tom's cost of being misunderstood as saying that Ted is not a fine friend when Ted is a fine friend is significant, since this could result in his good friend's reputation being harmed. Thus, neither of the condition sets (1) and (2) in Corollary 1 are satisfied, so there is no figurative PBE. ¥ This analysis suggests that irony will typically be negative or sarcastic. By definition, it need not be: according to the American Heritage Dictionary, verbal irony is "the use of words to express something opposite to their literal meaning," while sarcasm is "a sneering or cutting remark that is intended to wound." However, research by psychologists and linguists demonstrates that most instances of verbal irony are considered to be sarcastic (Lee and Katz, 1998; Gibbs, 2000; and Bryant and Fox Tree, 2002) . Our model provides an explanation. It implies that figurative speech is more likely when the cost of expressing a thought directly is higher and when the benefit of being understood, or equivalently the cost of being misunderstood, is lower. If the speaker's thought is negative (positive), speaking ironically involves using an expression that has a literal meaning that is positive (negative). Having an expression with a positive literal meaning be interpreted naïvely is generally less costly than having an expression with a negative literal meaning be interpreted naïvely. Moreover, the cost of expressing a negative thought directly is generally higher than the cost of expressing a positive thought directly. Thus, irony is more likely to be negative than positive.
Extended Model: Potential Disagreement on Actions
So far, we have assumed that the speaker and listener both derive a benefit if the listener correctly interprets the speaker's type. However, the speaker may derive no benefit from the listener correctly interpreting the speaker's type if the listener is of a type who would not cooperate with the speaker's type. We now extend the model to allow for this possibility.
The model is the same as the basic model except that now the listener is also one of two additional types,  ∈ { 1   2 }: a type,  1 , who would cooperate with the speaker regardless of the speaker's type, and a type,  2 , who would only cooperate with the speaker following an inference that the speaker's type is  2 . Thus, the listener is now one of a total of four
is the action that the type-( ) listener would take following an inference that the speaker's type is .
As before, if the speaker's type is  1 , the speaker sends the direct message " 1 " or the ambiguous message " 2 ". If the speaker's type is  2 , the speaker sends the direct message " 2 " or the ambiguous message " 2 ". The speaker's costs of sending, and the listener's costs of receiving, direct messages may depend on the listener's type. If the listener's type is (  1 ), the speaker's costs of sending messages " 1 " and " 2 " are   11  0 and   21  0, 20 respectively, and the listener's costs of receiving " 1 " and " 2 " are   11  0 and   21  0, respectively. If the listener's type is (  2 ), the speaker's costs of sending " 1 " and " 2 " are   12  0 and   22  0, respectively, and the listener's costs of receiving " 1 " and " 2 " are   12  0 and   22  0, respectively. If the speaker's type is  1 , the speaker incurs cost   11  0 of sending " 2 " if the listener's type is (  1 ) and cost   12  0 of sending " 2 " if the listener's type is (  2 ). The type-(  1 ) and type-(  2 ) listeners incur costs   11  0 and   12  0 of receiving " 2 ", respectively. The type-( 1  ) listener either interprets " 2 " literally as indicating  2 or figuratively as indicating  1 , i.e., chooses between actions ( 1  ) and ( 2  ). The type-( 2  ) listener always interprets " 2 " as indicating  2 and so always chooses action ( 2  ).
If the listener's type is (  1 ), the speaker and type-(  1 ) listener both want action (  1 ) to be chosen if the speaker's type is . More precisely, if the state is  1 , and the type-(  1 ) listener takes action ( 1   1 ), then the speaker receives a benefit   11  0 and the type-(  1 ) listener receives a benefit   11  0. If the state is  2 , and the type-(  1 ) listener takes action ( 2   1 ), the speaker receives a benefit   21  0 and the type-(  1 ) listener receives a benefit   21  0.
If the listener's type is (  2 ), the speaker and type-(  2 ) listener both want action ( 2   2 ) to be chosen if the speaker's type is  2 . However, only the type-(  2 ) listener wants action ( 1   2 ) to be chosen if the speaker's type is  1 . More precisely, if the state is  2 , and the type-(  2 ) listener takes ( 2   2 ), then the speaker receives a benefit   22  0 and the type-(  2 ) listener receives   22  0. However, if the state is  1 , and the type-(  2 ) listener takes ( 1   2 ), then the speaker receives no benefit, i.e.,   12 = 0    11 , while the type-(  2 ) listener receives a benefit   12  0.
Let  ∈ (0 1) be the prior probability that the listener is of type  1 . The extensive form of the game is given in Figure 2 . The speaker has two information sets, labelled 1 and 2, and the listener has two non-singleton information sets, labelled 1 and 2.
We make the following reasonable assumptions:   12 −   12    11 −   11  0 (the speaker's cost savings from indirectly communicating  1 is always positive and is greater if the listener is uncooperative) and   21    22 and   22    21 (the speaker's benefit of communicating  2 is greater if the listener is cooperative and the speaker's cost of directly communicating  2 is greater if the listener is non-cooperative).
There are six possible types of figurative PBEs in this game. In a type-PS1 figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 2 " in state  1 and in state  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and thus taking action ( 1   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  2 and thus taking action ( 2   2 ). In a type-SS1
figurative PBE, the speaker sends message " 2 " when the speaker's type is  1 and message " 2 " when the speaker's type is  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 "
as  1 and thus taking action ( 1   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  2 and thus taking action ( 2   2 ). In a type-PS1 or type-SS1 figurative PBE, the probability that speech is figurative is .
In a type-PP figurative PBE, the speaker sends " 2 " in state  1 and in state  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and thus taking ( 1   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and thus taking ( 1   2 ). In a type-SP figurative PBE, the speaker sends " 2 " in state  1 and " 2 " in state  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and thus taking ( 1   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and thus taking ( 1   2 ). In a type-PP or type-SP figurative PBE, the probability that speech is figurative is .
In a type-PS2 figurative PBE, the speaker sends " 2 " in state  1 and in state  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  2 and taking ( 2   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and taking ( 1   2 ). In a type-SS2
figurative PBE, the speaker sends " 2 " in state  1 and " 2 " in state  2 , the type-( 1   1 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  2 and taking ( 2   1 ), and the type-( 1   2 ) listener responds by interpreting " 2 " as  1 and taking ( 1   2 ). In a type-PS2 or type-SS2 figurative PBE, the probability that speech is figurative is (1 − ).
There are also many types of non-figurative PBEs. To simplify the analysis of the ex- 
Existence of Figurative Equilibria
We now provide conditions for each of the possible figurative equilibria to exist:
Proposition 2 There is a type-SP figurative PBE iff
There is a type-PP figurative PBE iff
] and (6)
] and (7)
There is no type-SS1 or type-SS2 figurative PBE.
The following comparative statics follow from Proposition 2 and our assumptions:
Corollary 3 There is a figurative PBE (of one type or another) for a larger range of parameters if  is lower,  is higher,   12 is higher,   12 is lower, or   11 is lower.
Ceteris paribus, speech is more likely to be figurative if the probability that the listener is cooperative () is lower or if the cost of speaking unambiguously to an uncooperative listener (  12 ) is higher, since this increases the speaker's expected cost of being unambiguous.
Application
We now employ the condition sets (4)-(7) in Proposition 2 to provide a systematic analysis of another classic example of indirect speech, veiled bribery. The example has been adapted from Pinker (2008) and Pinker, Nowak, and Lee (2008) . don't report this," message " 1 ", or he can say, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," message " 2 ". If Ted is asking for leniency, he can say, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," message " 2 ", or he can say, avoiding any suggestive antics with his wallet, "I'm sorry and will be extra careful from now on. Could you let me go with a warning just this once?," message " 2 ".
Veiled Bribery
Suppose the officer is dishonest and unreasonable. If the officer is sophisticated, and Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," then the officer can interpret this as meaning that Ted is attempting to bribe him and thus say "yes" and accept a bribe, action ( 1   1 ), or he can interpret it as meaning that Ted is asking for leniency and thus say "no" and issue him a ticket, action ( 2   1 ). If the officer is naïve, and Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," then the officer always interprets this as meaning that Ted is asking for leniency and thus says "no" and issues him a ticket, ( 2   1 ). If Ted says, "I'll give you $100 if you don't report this," the officer always understands that Ted wants to bribe him and thus says "yes" and accepts a bribe, action ( 1   1 ). If Ted says, "I'm sorry and will be extra careful from now on. Could you let me go with a warning just this once?," the officer always understands that
Ted is asking for leniency and thus says "no" and issues him a ticket, action ( 2   1 ).
Suppose the officer is honest and reasonable. If the officer is sophisticated, and Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," the officer can interpret this as meaning that Ted is asking him to accept a bribe and thus say "no" and issue him a ticket, action ( 1   2 ), or he can interpret it as meaning that Ted is asking for reasonable leniency and thus say "yes" and let him off with a stern warning, ( 2   2 ). If the officer is naïve, and Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?,"
the officer always interprets this as meaning that Ted is asking for leniency and thus says "yes" and lets him off with a stern warning, ( 2   2 ). If Ted says, "I'll give you $100 if you don't report this," the officer always understands that Ted is asking him to accept a bribe and thus says "no" and arrests him for attempted bribery, ( 1   2 ). If Ted says, "I'm sorry and will be extra careful from now on. Could you let me go with a warning just this once?,"
the officer always understands that Ted is asking for reasonable leniency and thus says "yes" and lets him off with a warning, ( 2   2 ).
A situation where there is a type-PS1 figurative PBE. The dishonest/unreasonable officer's benefit   11 of correctly understanding that Ted is asking him to accept a bribe if Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," is high since he is interested in taking a bribe. The dishonest/unreasonable officer's benefit   21 of correctly understanding that Ted is asking for leniency when Ted says, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," is moderate since he does not care much about being reasonable with his discretion to apply the law and is not much worried about being accused by Ted of being willing to be bribed as there would be no hard evidence. and Ted's benefit   11 of successfully communicating to the officer that he is asking him to accept a bribe is high (because Ted really wants to avoid a ticket, e.g., because the insurance premium would rise substantially with an additional offense), then neither of the condition sets (4)- (7) in Proposition 2 are satisfied, so there is no figurative PBE. ¥
The model also delivers a policy implication in this application. In any type of figurative PBE, the probability of a completed bribe is  (the officer must be dishonest/unreasonable and sophisticated and Ted must intend to bribe). In contrast, in any outcome that is not figurative, the probability of a completed bribe is  (the officer must be dishonest/unreasonable and Ted must intend to bribe, but the officer need not be sophisticated since even an unsophisticated officer understands a bribe when it is direct). On the other hand, in any outcome, whether figurative or not, the probability of an attempted bribe is  (since Ted always attempts to bribe if he intends to bribe, the question in this case being only how he attempts to bribe). Now, as Corollary 3 and the above analysis demonstrate, a figurative PBE is more likely if the punishment for attempted bribery (  12 ) is higher. Thus, increasing the punishment for attempted bribery reduces the probability of completed bribery even if it does not affect the probability of attempted bribery. The reason is that it induces the briber to bribe more indirectly, which reduces the probability that the bribe will succeed.
This provides a novel argument for the effectiveness of laws that strictly punish not only completed bribery but also attempted bribery.
Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we have developed a model of communication to help understand how context affects whether or not speech is figurative or indirect. The model provides analytical conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium and delivers a number of comparative statics results. For example, it predicts that a greater benefit to the listener of correctly understanding the speaker or a greater disagreement over actions between the speaker and listener increases the likelihood that figurative speech is employed. We also applied the model to systematically analyze various forms of figurative speech, including terseness, irony, and veiled bribery. The model provided an explanation for why irony is usually sarcastic, and it yielded a policy implication with respect to bribery: increasing the penalty for attempted bribery reduces the probability of successful bribery taking place, even if it has no effect on the probability of attempted bribery occurring, because it induces the briber to bribe more indirectly, which reduces the probability that the bribe will succeed.
The model could be extended in several potentially interesting ways. First, while we introduced a naïve type of the listener who always interprets messages literally (in order to pin down the literal meaning of ambiguous messages), it might also be interesting to introduce a naïve type of the speaker who always uses messages literally. One interesting additional issue that arises when introducing a naïve type of the speaker is that figurative speech can then potentially be a signal of the speaker's cognitive ability. Indeed, one of the reasons people use figurative or indirect language might simply be to show off that they are sophisticated and not naïve. Investigating this possibility would require modeling the benefits to the speaker of an inference by the listener that the speaker is sophisticated.
Second, while we employed the concept of plausible deniability to interpret the costs associated with different messages in our extended model with potential disagreement over actions, it would be interesting to provide a more formal representation of the concept. One simple way to formally represent plausible deniability in our extended model would be to explicitly model the continuation game following the chosen messages and actions. In the bribery example, if Ted says to the police officer who stopped him for speeding, "Gee officer, is there any way you could let me go with a warning?," and if the officer interprets this as a bribe (rightfully or wrongfully) and arrests Ted, then the game would proceed to Court,
where Ted would have the option to deny that he had meant to bribe the officer, in which case there may be too little proof for conviction. But if Ted had initially said to the officer, "I'll give you $100 if you don't report this," it would be hard for him to deny in court that he had meant to bribe the officer, and a conviction would be more likely. In situations with potential disagreement over actions, indirect speech leaves open the option to deny having had certain intentions. Explicitly modeling this option value of indirect speech is another potentially interesting avenue for future work.
Third, it might be fruitful to explore conversational dynamics. One might try to add to the model an earlier stage in which a person can say something that sets the context for the exchange and possibly influences the beliefs of the other person, thereby changing the equilibrium. Some types may want to change the equilibrium in particular ways. One might also try to add to the model a subsequent stage in which a person can follow up on a related 31 issue or ask for clarification of a previous one. Clarification would undo the figurativeness of speech, but, in many cases, the listener may choose to not ask for clarification.
Lastly, it might be interesting to test the predictions of our model experimentally. Subjects could be offered a choice of messages with different levels of directness, and one could observe whether their choices vary with the parameters of the conversational situation in the ways that our model predicts.
